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An important function of language is to share and coordinate our attitudes in
communication. In inquiry we manage our beliefs about how things are, how they
might be, and how possibilities may hang together. Suppose we are investigating a
murder. Our evaluation of (1) depends on what our evidence is like, as reflected in
(2).
(1) The butler might be the killer.
(2) A: The butler might be the killer.
B: Yeah, we can’t rule him out. We still need to see if his alibi checks out.
B0: No, it can’t be him. It must have been the gardener; I saw him lurking
around just before the crime.
Epistemic uses of modal verbs (‘‘epistemic modals’’) like those in (1)–(2) can also
be used in characterizing one another’s states of mind, as in (3).
(3) A thinks the butler might be the killer.
Such uses of epistemic language are commonplace. How to capture them is not.
Some theorists claim that the dependence of our evaluation of (1) on what
information we accept derives from a dependence of the interpretation of (1) on a
contextually relevant body of information. A prominent approach—call it contex-
tualism—treats such sentences with epistemic modals as semantically context-
sensitive in the same kind of way as sentences with paradigm context-sensitive
expressions like ‘here’, demonstratives, pronouns, etc. In a context where Anna is
most salient, (4) conventionally conveys that Anna won a medal; in a context where
Betty is most salient, (4) conventionally conveys that Betty won a medal.
(4) She won a medal.
Likewise, according to contextualism, in a context where Annette’s information iA
is relevant, (1) conveys (roughly) that iA is compatible with the butler’s being the
killer; but in a context where Ben’s information iB is relevant, (1) conveys (roughly)
that iB is compatible with the butler’s being the killer. The semantic content of (1),
and whether it is true or false, depends on what information is relevant in the
discourse context, just as the semantic content of (4), and whether it is true or false,
depends on what female is most salient in the discourse context. (We will refine this
characterization of contextualism more precisely in due course.)
Assimilating the context-sensitivity of epistemic modals to that of paradigm
context-sensitive expressions may seem to afford an attractive diagnosis of
discourse-oriented uses like in (2). Yet serious objections have been raised. There
are two main classes of data that have been thought problematic: first, discourse
phenomena involving (dis)agreement; second, the behavior of epistemic modals in
various complex linguistic environments, such as in attitude ascriptions and
conditionals. Which is to say: epistemic modals are happy (=contextualist-friendly)
neither embedded nor unembedded. Many theorists appeal to the distinctive
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discourse properties and embedding behavior of epistemic modals to motivate
revising the compositional semantics or postsemantics. Though these theories differ
in their details, they agree in distinguishing the context-sensitivity of epistemic
modals from that of paradigm context-sensitive expressions. Even those who wish
to maintain a contextualist semantics often do so by resorting to ad hoc pragmatic
principles.
This paper focuses on three prominent objections to contextualism from
embedding: first, that contextualism mischaracterizes subjects’ states of mind;
second, that contextualism fails to predict how epistemic modals are obligatorily
linked to the subject in attitude ascriptions; and third, that contextualism fails to
explain the persisting anomalousness of so-called ‘‘epistemic contradictions’’
(Yalcin 2007, 2011) in suppositional contexts (Sect. 2). Drawing on a more general
framework for implementing a contextualist theory (Silk 2015a, 2016a, b), I argue
that we can capture the relevant embedding phenomena with epistemic modals with
a static contextualist semantics and general, independently motivated principles of
local interpretation and pragmatic reasoning (Sect. 3). This should be of interest to
theorists who are compelled by the thought that the interpretation of epistemic
modals depends, in some sense, on context, but who have reservations about
innovations introduced by relativist, expressivist, or dynamic accounts. I conclude
by briefly examining how the proposed contextualist account compares with certain
relativist/expressivist accounts (Sect. 4).
For concreteness I will focus on epistemic modal auxiliaries of possibility and
necessity (‘may’, ‘might’, ‘must’, etc.). But it’s important to remember that
epistemic modal verbs are members of a broader class of epistemic vocabulary—
what Swanson (2011) calls ‘‘the language of subjective uncertainty.’’ Further, the
objections considered in this paper aren’t the only challenges that arise concerning
epistemic vocabulary in embedded contexts. Though I think there are well-
motivated ways of extending the proposed framework , I won’t argue for that here.
The account in this paper should give a flavor for the kinds of explanatory resources
available to contextualist theories.1
Our question is whether bare (unmodified) epistemic modal clauses, like in (1)–
(3), can be given a successful contextualist semantics.2 I would like to make two
1 See Silk (2016a: ch. 7) for extensions to epistemic adjectives. See also Silk (2016a: Sects. 4.2.4–4.2.5)
for discussion of epistemic modals in factive attitude contexts (cf. Weatherson 2008; Lasersohn 2009) and
inferences (cf. Schroeder 2009; Braun 2013). See Klinedinst and Rothschild (2012), Yalcin (2012b),
Moss (2015) for additional challenges from embedding.
2 Sometimes what body of information is relevant for interpreting an epistemic modal is explicitly
specified, as in (i).
(i) In view of Alice’s evidence, the butler might be the killer.
One might treat the modal words themselves as indexicals (like ‘here’) whose semantic contents depend
on context. Alternatively one could treat the lexical items as having invariant semantic values and having
argument places which may be filled by contextual parameters. Officially I remain neutral on these
options. We will address details of the formal semantics in Sect. 3.1.
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preliminary remarks on the relevant sense in which contextualism treats epistemic
modals as context-sensitive. First, contextualists sometimes motivate their views by
noting that many modal verbs can have different ‘‘readings’’ in different contexts.
For example, ‘must’ in (5) targets a body of norms.
(5) We must help the poor.
All types of theories—contextualist, relativist, expressivist, invariantist—can
accept that certain modal words, qua lexical items, are context-sensitive in the
sense that the context of utterance determines what type of reading the modal
receives.3 What is at-issue is, given that the modal has an epistemic reading,
whether a specific body of information supplied by the context of utterance
figures in calculating the semantic content, or compositional semantic value, of
the sentence-in-context, where what information is supplied may vary across
contexts within a world.4 Non-contextualist accounts deny this. Debates about
contextualism arise for words whose lexical semantics fixes an epistemic reading
(e.g., ‘probably’, ‘likely’).
Second, the focus in this paper is on (what I call) expressive uses of epistemic
modals. Adapting terminology from Lyons (1977, 1995), say that an unembedded
modal is used expressively if the speaker is presented as endorsing the consider-
ations with respect to which the modal is interpreted; and say that the modal is used
non-expressively if the speaker isn’t presented in this way.5 The non-expressive
deontic use in (6) simply reports what Ed’s parents’ rules require. Similarly the non-
expressive epistemic use in (7), adapted from Kratzer (2012), describes what is
possible according to the information provided in the filing cabinet.
(6) Bert: Ed has to be home by 10. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if I
were him.
a. &According to Ed’s parents’ rules, Ed has to be home by 10.
(7) [Context: We’re standing before a locked filing cabinet. None of us has had
access to the information in it, but we know it contains the police’s complete
evidence about the murder of Klotho Fischer and narrows down the set of
3 On this I disagree with the sentiments expressed in von Fintel and Gillies (2008), Finlay (2009, 2014),
Bjo¨rnsson and Finlay (2010), Dowell (2011, 2012), Braun (2013), MacFarlane (2014: 284).
4 Following Yalcin (2014), there may be reasons to avoid using ‘(semantic) content’ as a label for a
compositional semantic value in context. I use ‘content’ for this type of object simply for familiarity; my
usage makes no assumptions about its potential broader theoretical role.
5 This distinction has been noted under various descriptions in a range of areas. See also, e.g., Hare
(1952), von Wright (1963), Lasersohn (2005), Stephenson (2007), Narrog (2005), Verstraete (2007). For
discussion in the literature on epistemic modals, see Yalcin (2007: 1012–1013), MacFarlane (2010:
13–16, 21–22; 2014: 155–156, 259–261, 272–277, 298), Egan (2011: 236), and Moss (2013: 7n.6; 2015:
41–43). For critical discussion, see Silk (2012, 2015b, 2016a) and Swanson (2016b). I use ‘endorsement’
as a general cover term for acceptance attitudes of various kinds, not simply deontic/evaluative; one can
‘‘endorse’’ (accept) evidence, information, norms, goals, etc. The present notion of an expressive use
shouldn’t be confused with the category of linguistic expressives (e.g., interjections, expressive attributive
adjectives, etc.); it is an open question, on my terminology, whether expressive uses are to be analyzed on
the model of linguistic expressives.
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suspects. We’re betting on who might have killed Fischer according to the
information in the filing cabinet. The butler, who we all know is innocent,
says:]
I might have done it. (Kratzer 2012: 98–99)
The descriptive beliefs expressed by (6)–(7) can be reported in attitude ascriptions:
(8) Bert thinks Ed has to be home by 10.
(9) The butler thinks he might have done it.
The verifying norms/information in (6)–(9) needn’t be accepted by Bert/the butler.
All types of theories can accept that such descriptive uses—uses readily
paraphrasable with an explicit ‘according to’-type phrase—are context-sensitive in
the same way as paradigm context-sensitive expressions. The distinctive claim of
contextualism is that the expressive uses of epistemic modals are context-sensitive
in the same way as (e.g.) (4) and (7). The expressive uses in (2) intuitively convey
epistemic attitudes about the embedded proposition, which reflects the subject
matter of the discourse. States of mind expressed in expressive uses can be reported
in attitude ascriptions, as in (3) or (10b).
(10) a. A: It must be raining outside. Look at all those people with wet umbrellas.
b. A thinks it must be raining outside.
Attitude ascriptions such as (3)/(10b)—call them expressive epistemic attitude
ascriptions—present the attitude subject as accepting the information with respect
to which the modal is interpreted. It is expressive uses which have been argued to be
problematic for contextualism. (Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, assume all
examples involve expressive uses.)
2 Embedding problems
2.1 First-order states of mind
Insofar as contextualism treats the contextually relevant information as figuring in
the content of an epistemic modal clause, contextualism seems to treat (11) as
ascribing to Alice the belief that the contextually relevant information is compatible
with the proposition that the butler is the killer.
(11) Alice thinks the butler might be the killer.
The worry is that this incorrectly treats epistemic attitude ascriptions as ascribing
higher-order attitudes about a body of information.6 Here is Seth Yalcin (2007: 997):
Suppose my guard dog Fido hears a noise downstairs and goes to check it
out... I say:
6 In the broader literature, cf., e.g., Stanley (2003), Ko¨lbel (2004), Yalcin (2007), Rothschild (2012), Silk
(2013).
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[(12)] Fido thinks there might be an intruder downstairs.
...Does [this] mean, as a [contextualist] semantics requires, that Fido believes
that it is compatible with what Fido believes that there is an intruder
downstairs? That is not plausible. Surely the truth of [(12)] does not turn on
recherche´ facts about canine self-awareness. Surely [(12)] may be true even if
Fido is incapable of such second-order beliefs.
Likewise, (13) doesn’t ascribe to Alice the sorts of attitudes ascribed in (13a)–(13b):
(13) Alice fears that the butler might be the killer.
a. \Alice fears that it’s compatible with her/our/whomever’s evidence
that the butler is the killer.
b. \Alice fears that she doesn’t know who the killer is.
Alice’s fear is about who the killer is, not herself or the strength of her evidence.
Epistemic attitude ascriptions seem to characterize the subject’s first-order state
of mind. (11) characterizes Alice as accepting information which is compatible with
the butler’s being the killer. The challenge is to capture this within a contextualist
semantics.
2.2 Obligatory shifting
Epistemic modals appear to behave differently from paradigm context-sensitive expres-
sions (‘‘PCS-expressions’’) under attitude verbs. Even when embedded under ‘thinks’, ‘I’
must be interpreted with respect to the context of utterance, or ‘‘global’’ context. (I use
‘global context’, ‘context of utterance’, and ‘discourse context’ interchangeably.)
(14) B: A thinks I am hungry. (global reading obligatory)
a. &A thinks B is hungry.
b. \A thinks A is hungry.
Not all context-sensitive expressions must be interpreted with respect to the context of
utterance in this way. ‘Local’, for example, can be interpreted with respect to the
‘‘local’’ (subordinate, derived) context characterizing the subject’s attitude state, as in
(15b). If Bob is in Boston, Pete is in Ann Arbor, and Pete thinks that Al is at Ashley’s, a
bar in Ann Arbor, Bob can report Pete’s belief by uttering (15). Yet ‘local’ can still also
be interpreted with respect to the global context, as in (15a). Bob can utter (15) to report
Pete’s belief that Al is at Ashley’s even if Bob is in Ann Arbor and Pete is in Boston.
(15) Bob: Pete thinks Al is at a local bar. (global reading possible)
a. &Pete thinks Al is at a bar local to Bob
b. &Pete thinks Al is at a bar local to Pete
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The generalization is that PCS-expressions are at least optionally interpreted with
respect to the context of utterance. By contrast, there seems to be no reading of (11)
on which Chip is ascribing to Alice the belief that it’s compatible with Chip’s
evidence that the butler is the killer.
(11) Chip: Alice thinks the butler might be the killer. (local reading obligatory)
The worry is that, unlike PCS-expressions, epistemic modals are obligatorily linked
to the attitude subject.
This objection is sometimes put by saying that epistemic modals needn’t be
interpreted with respect to the information relevant in the context of utterance.7 This
is too weak. The relevant contrast is that, unlike PCS-expressions, epistemic modals
can’t be interpreted with respect to the global context when embedded in attitude
ascriptions. So, it’s insufficient for contextualists to reply by pointing to cases, like
(15), where PCS-expressions are linked to the attitude subject, or to reply by noting
that in contexts where we are reporting someone’s belief, it can be that person’s
information that is ‘‘relevant.’’8 The worry is that there is no reading of (11) that
characterizes Alice’s beliefs in terms of the information accepted in the discourse
context.
2.3 Epistemic contradictions
The third objection concerns the behavior of epistemic modals in suppositional
contexts. Consider the following Moore-paradoxical sentence:
(16) #The butler is the killer, but I don’t think that he is.
Though it would be anomalous to utter (16), the incoherence vanishes when (16) is
embedded in suppositional contexts:
(17) okSuppose the butler is the killer but I (/you) don’t think he is.
(18) okIf the butler is the killer but I don’t think he is, I’m screwed.
That (16) can be coherently entertained shows that it isn’t a semantic contradiction.
The anomalousness of (16) is due to a feature of asserting (16). Roughly, the second
conjunct denies what asserting the first conjunct expresses.
7 In the broader literature, see Cappelen and Lepore (2005), Brogaard (2008), Ko¨lbel (2009).
8 See DeRose (2005, 2009), Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009), Dowell (2011), von Fintel and Gillies
(2011), Finlay (2014: 236–245), Yanovich (2014). Remember that we are focusing only on expressive
uses—uses in which the speaker/subject is presented as endorsing the information with respect to which
the modal is interpreted. Some authors have claimed that epistemic modals disallow non-expressive uses
in attitude contexts (Stephenson 2007; Weatherson 2008). That isn’t what is at-issue here. Hence pointing
to examples, like (9), involving apparently non-expressive uses of epistemic modals in attitude ascriptions
won’t suffice for responding to the present objection (e.g., Dowell 2011: 21–22).
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Seth Yalcin (2007, 2011) notices something striking about analogous examples
like (19) with ‘might’: Unlike (16), the ‘‘epistemic contradiction’’ (Yalcin’s phrase)
in (19) cannot even be coherently entertained, as reflected in (20)–(21).
(19) #The butler is the killer, but he might not be.
(20) #Suppose that [the butler is the killer but he might not be].
(21) #If the butler is the killer but he might not be, I’m screwed.
Yet this can’t be because (19) is an ordinary contradiction, since ‘Might /’ doesn’t
entail ‘/’.
Embedded epistemic contradictions pose a challenge for contextualist semantics
in general. For any (possibly single-membered) group G, it should be coherent to
entertain the possibility that / and G doesn’t think/know that /. But it isn’t coherent
to entertain the possibility that / and it might be that :/: So, ‘/ and might :/’ isn’t
equivalent to ‘/ and it’s compatible with G’s information that :/’, for any G.
Some have responded that the anomalousness of epistemic contradictions persists
in suppositional contexts because epistemic modals are always anomalous in
suppositional contexts (cf. Schnieder 2010; Crabill 2013).9 I have two worries with
this response. First, perhaps contrary to initial appearances, epistemic modals can
felicitously occur in suppositional contexts:
(22) If the butler might be the killer, we should watch our backs around him, just
in case.
(23) If a tiger might be in the bushes, don’t wait to find out.
(24) Imagine you’re stuck at your cubicle and it must be raining out—you see a
bunch of people come in with wet umbrellas.
Intuitively, the advice in (22) is conditional on one’s taking it to be possible that the
butler is the killer. What (24) asks you to imagine is that you have indirect evidence
which implies that it’s raining.
Second, observe that ‘‘epistemic contradiction’’-style phenomena arise with other
expressions which have figured in recent contextualism/relativism debates:
(25) a. #The brownies are tasty but we all hate them.
b. #Suppose the brownies are tasty but we all hate them.
(26) [Context: Ken is 50600 tall.]
a. #Ken is tall but the standards for tallness are super high.
b. #Suppose Ken is tall but the standards for tallness are super high.
9 For the descriptive claim that epistemic modals are disallowed in conditional antecedents, see, e.g.,
Leech (1971), Coates (1983), Drubig (2001). I will bracket any differences between examples with
conditionals and examples with suppositional verbs (see Dorr and Hawthorne 2013 for discussion). See
Verstraete (2007), Hacquard and Wellwood (2012), Anand and Hacquard (2013) for corpus studies on the
distribution of epistemic modals in embedded contexts.
A. Silk
123
However, there are no putative analogous embedding restrictions on (e.g.) ‘tasty’ or
‘tall’. Contextualists should be wary of responses which turn on features specific to
epistemic modals. Such explanations are unlikely to generalize.
3 Embedding solutions
I will argue that we can derive the embedding phenomena from Sect. 2 from a
particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, indepen-
dently attested mechanisms of local interpretation, and general features of discourse
contexts. We will also see that the literature has been too quick to grant certain of
the data. The distinctiveness of epistemic modals’ embedding behavior shouldn’t be
overstated.10
3.1 Formal semantics
I start by briefly characterizing the contextualist formal semantics I will be
assuming. Following common practice I treat modal verbs as semantically
associated with a parameter or variable determining a set of premises (proposi-
tions).11 Roughly put, ‘Must /’ says that / follows from these premises, and ‘May
/’ says that / is compatible with these premises. Since modals can occur in
intensional contexts, premise sets are indexed to the world of evaluation. What
context supplies for interpretation is a premise frame (written ‘P’), or function from
worlds w to premise sets (written ‘P(w)’). Epistemic readings call for a premise
frame that encodes a body of information (evidence, knowledge, etc.).12
10 See Silk (2016a) for developments of a more general framework for implementing contextualism,
which includes discussion of discourse dynamics with unembedded uses, as well as applications to
epistemic adjectives and various other types of expressions which have figured in recent contextualism/
relativism debates.
11 See esp. Kratzer (1977, 1981, 1991); also van Fraassen (1973), Lewis (1973), Veltman (1976), Lewis
(1981), Goble (2013). Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) semantics uses two premise sets: a ‘‘modal base’’ premise
set F(w) that describes some set of relevant background facts in w, and an ‘‘ordering source’’ premise set
G(w) that represents the content of some ideal in w. This complication won’t be relevant here; I will treat
modal sentences as evaluated with respect a single finite, consistent premise set. For simplicity I will
sometimes suppress the world-indexing on premise sets; talk about a proposition p ‘‘following from (/
being compatible with) P’’ can be understood as short for saying that p follows from (/is compatible with)
P(w), for any relevant world w. (For a possible-worlds proposition p and set of propositions S, p follows
from S (S implies p) iff
T
S  p, and p is compatible with S iff T S [ pf gð Þ 6¼ ;.) I will use boldfaced
type for parameters/variables, and italics for their values in context. I treat ‘/’, ‘w’, etc. as schematic
letters to be replaced with declarative sentences. For convenience I sometimes refer to the possible worlds
proposition expressed by ‘/’ by dropping the single quotes—e.g., writing ‘s \ /’ as short for ‘s \ s‘/’tc’,
where s‘/’tc ¼ fw : s‘/’tc;w ¼ 1g:
12 Differences in which epistemic relation is relevant won’t matter in what follows. To reiterate, I am not
claiming that the general Kratzer-inspired framework for modals calls for contextualism about epistemic
modals (Sect. 1). All types of theories can accept that the modal verbs are context-sensitive in the sense
that the context of utterance determines what type of reading the modal receives. (For instance, a relativist
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It’s common in linguistic semantics to treat various paradigm context-sensitive
expressions on the model of variables, which receive their values from a
contextually determined assignment function gc (e.g., Heim and Kratzer 1998).
To fix ideas I assume that premise frame parameters are also syntactically realized
as variables (von Fintel 1994; Frank 1996; Schaffer 2011). Semantically associating
epistemic modals with a contextual variable places constraints on their felicitous use
and interpretation. To illustrate, compare a treatment of pronouns as variables. A
free pronoun, say ‘it4’, denotes the individual assigned to it by the assignment:
(27) sit4t
c;gc;w = gcð4Þ
(28) sit4 is a bookt
c;gc;w ¼ 1 iff gcð4Þ is a book in w
Using ‘It4 is a book’ to describe, say, Middlemarch assumes that the context
determines an assignment gc that maps the (typed) index 4 to Middlemarch, and
asserts that gcð4Þ is a book. Such an assignment represents that Middlemarch is the
most salient object in the context. Likewise, a free premise frame variable, say P7,
denotes the premise frame determined by the assignment:
(29) sP7t
c;gc;w = gcð7ÞðwÞ
(30) sSal might P7 have killed Fischert
c;gc;w = 1 iff
Tðgcð7ÞðwÞ [ fkgÞ 6¼ ;
Using ‘Sal might P7 have killed Fischer’ in the context in (7) assumes that the
context determines an assignment gc that maps the (typed) index 7 to a
premise frame P encoding the information in the filing cabinet, and asserts that
gcð7ÞðwÞ is compatible with the proposition k that Sal killed Fischer. Such an
assignment represents that P encodes the salient information provided in the
filing cabinet.
Expressive uses of epistemic modals, I suggest, call for a premise frame
variable that represents information endorsed in the context. For expository
purposes I will write ‘Pe’ for the variable invoked in expressive uses of epistemic
modals, with the index e simply to indicate the intended assignment and
interpretation of the variable. In the unembedded case Pe typically corresponds to
the discourse common ground—the set of propositions taken for granted for
purposes of conversation (Stalnaker 1974, 1978; complications will follow
shortly). This reflects the paradigmatic role of epistemic modals in communal
inquiry. There are various ways of formalizing these points. One option is to
introduce the endorsement condition as a feature or presupposition on premise
frame variables:
(31) sPe8t
c;gc;w = gcð8ÞðwÞ if gcð8Þ is a body of information endorsed in c,
undefined otherwise
Footnote 12 continued
or expressivist might treat what context supplies for interpreting a modal as a function from an evaluation
world and judge to premise sets; what would be special about epistemic readings is that the contextually
supplied function non-trivially depends on the value of the judge (cf., e.g., Stephenson 2007).
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Generally speaking, an expressive use of epistemic ‘Might (/Must) /’ presupposes a
value for Pe, Pc, and is true at w iff / is compatible with (/follows from) PcðwÞ.13
The expressive use presupposes that the verifying information Pc is endorsed in the
context.
With the above formal semantics at hand, let’s return to the objections from
Sect. 2.
3.2 First-order states of mind
The first objection was that contextualism incorrectly treats attitude ascriptions like
(11) as ascribing higher-order attitudes about a body of information.
(11) Alice thinks the butler might be the killer.
First, note that on the semantics from Sect. 3.1 there is no reference to the discourse
context or ‘‘the relevant information,’’ considered de dicto, in the content of the
attitude ascribed. Common characterizations of contextualism notwithstanding,14 on
the present semantics epistemic modal sentences aren’t fundamentally about an
individual or group; they make logical claims given an epistemic premise set. (11)
ascribes to Alice the belief that a certain set of propositions is compatible with the
proposition b that the butler is the killer. But how does treating (11) as ascribing to
Alice this sort of logical belief capture the intuition that (11) characterizes Alice’s
first-order belief state?
It’s well-known that many embedding environments introduce local (derived,
subordinate) contexts. In (32) the presupposition associated with ‘Ursula’ (‘it’, ‘the
unicorn’) that a suitable discourse referent exists isn’t ‘‘globally satisfied,’’ i.e.
implied by the discourse common ground; the presupposition is, however, satisfied
in the expression’s local context, i.e. the context representing Fred’s beliefs
(Stalnaker 1988, 2014; Heim 1992; Geurts 1998).
(32) There are no unicorns, but Fred thinks there are. He thinks he has a pet
unicorn named ‘Ursula’. He thinks Ursula (/it, /the unicorn) can fly.
Call readings such as the felicitous reading of (32) local readings. I use this label
descriptively for readings in which, intuitively speaking, a presupposition is
interpreted as contributing to the local (truth-conditional) content.15 Local
13 The subscripts are included simply for expository purposes to indicate the intended assignment and
interpretation of the variable. My occasional talk about context supplying values for variables can be
understood as short for talk about contextually determined assignment functions. For additional formal
semantic details see Silk (2016a: esp. Sects. 3.3.5–3.3.6, 3.5.1, 5.6).
14 E.g., Silk (2013: 212–213), MacFarlane (2014: 146–147), a.m.o.
15 Whether this intuitive characterization provides a proper theoretical characterization of the phenomena
is another matter (see also, e.g., Stalnaker 1974; Heim 1990; Schlenker 2009, 2010). What is important
for our purposes is simply that concrete states of mind are like concrete discourses in being
representable by abstract objects which supply semantic values for variables and other context-sensitive
expressions.
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interpretation (in this more-or-less pretheoretic sense) not only allows one to use
‘Ursula’ (‘it’, ‘the unicorn’) in (32) without presupposition failure. It also guides
how the expression is interpreted.
I suggest that we capture the intuition that (11) characterizes Alice’s first-order
state of mind in terms of the communicative upshot of locally interpreting the
embedded epistemic modal. Expressive uses of epistemic modals presuppose a
value for Pe; they presuppose a body of information endorsed in the context. With
epistemic attitude ascriptions the relevant context is the local context of the attitude
state; the locus of endorsement is the attitude subject. In locally satisfying the
presuppositions of ‘might’ in (11), one assumes that Alice’s state of mind
characterizes a value for Pe, PA, that makes the belief ascription true. Ascribing to
Alice the belief that PA is compatible with b via (11) communicates something
about Alice’s information state because of how the presuppositions of the epistemic
premise frame variable are assumed to be locally satisfied.
A natural move is to identify the locally supplied value for Pe with a premise
frame representing the subject’s beliefs, which determines the attitude verb’s
quantificational domain.16 But this implementation isn’t forced upon us. Consider
the following modification of (7):
(33) [Context: You are standing in front of a locked filing cabinet. You don’t have
access to its contents, but you know that it contains the complete evidence
about Fischer’s murder and narrows down the set of suspects. You have
partial amnesia, and although you remember that you had a grudge against
Fischer, you can’t remember if you ended up taking matters into your own
hands. I ask you whether it’s possible that you did it. You say:]
I don’t know. I don’t know whether I might have killed him.
Intuitively, ‘might’ is interpreted with respect to the information provided in the
filing cabinet. But the use is ‘‘expressive’’ in the sense that you treat this information
as authoritative and would accept it if you were explicitly presented with it. One
way of capturing this is as follows. Which premise set is relevant for evaluating a
modal sentence can depend on how things are, or on how things could be or could
have been. That is why premise sets are world-indexed and what context supplies,
reflecting the modal’s intended reading, is treated as a function from worlds to
premise sets. The information endorsed by the subject, hence value for Pe, is
represented by a premise frame—in (33), one which maps each world w to a set of
propositions P(w) encoding (among other things) the information in the filing
cabinet in w. Given your amnesia, what information is provided varies across your
epistemic alternatives. Roughly, (33) says that for some u, v in your epistemic
alternatives, P(u) is incompatible with your being the killer, and P(v) is compatible
with your being the killer.
16 The move would be to treat the value for Pe, P, as being such that
T
PðwÞ ¼ Doxx;w, where Doxx;w is
the set of worlds compatible with x’s beliefs in w. Compare the relativist/expressivist accounts in Yalcin
(2007), Hacquard (2010), MacFarlane (2011, 2014), Rothschild (2012), Silk (2013), Swanson (2016a);
see also Stalnaker (2014: chs. 6–7) for critical discussion.
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So, the contextualist can avoid the seemingly implausible claim that ‘‘an
embedded epistemic claim is always about the current investigation of the actual
context’’ (Yanovich 2014: 92). The relevant context with respect to which epistemic
modals (and other context-sensitive expressions) are interpreted can be the local
context characterizing an embedding environment. This doesn’t imply that the
discourse context plays no role in interpreting embedded epistemic modals.
Consider a third-person analogue of (33) in which Rudolf is the amnesiac, we’re
investigating the murder, and our question is whether to rule out Rudolf on the basis
of his testimony. In this context we might say:
(34) Rudolf thinks he might have done it.
How the value for Pe is determined in the local context, and whether it is identified
in terms of the subject’s attitude state, can depend on what issues are relevant in the
global discourse context.
3.3 Obligatory shifting
The treatment of epistemic attitude ascriptions in Sect. 3.2 reframes the worry from
Sect. 2.2: Even if presuppositions associated with context-sensitive expressions can
be locally satisfied, they don’t have to be. The contextualist semantics developed
thus far doesn’t itself exclude interpreting embedded epistemic modals with respect
to the information endorsed in the global context. However, I think this is a feature,
not a bug. Differences among epistemic modals and various other expressions vis-a`-
vis preferences for local/global readings can be explained, at least in part, in terms
of the sentences’ specific contents and general features of concrete discourses.
First consider an example from Jennifer Saul (1998: 366). We’re talking about
people’s views on Bob Dylan’s singing abilities. I know that Glenda, one of his
childhood friends, knows him only under the name ‘Robert Zimmerman’. Yet, since
you know him only under the name ‘Bob Dylan’, I can felicitously use ‘Bob Dylan’
to characterize Glenda’s belief, as in (35), even though she ‘‘wouldn’t put it that
way.’’
(35) Glenda thinks Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice. (Saul 1998: ex. 7)
This is because (a) what matters for our purposes is Glenda’s belief about the
individual with whom we associate ‘Bob Dylan’, (b) it doesn’t matter for our
purposes what, if anything, Glenda associates with ‘Bob Dylan’, and (c) we have
reason to express the content that Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice using ‘Bob
Dylan’ because it’s a convenient way of talking about the individual we want to talk
about.
This observation suggests the following analogous conditions for context to make
available a global reading of an epistemic belief ascription:
(a) What matters for our purposes is the subject’s belief about the logical claim in
question, as determined by the information endorsed in the discourse.
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(b) It doesn’t matter for our purposes what the subject’s information is.
(c) Nevertheless, we have reason to express the content of the subject’s belief
using an epistemic modal.
With epistemic modals, unlike (e.g.) names, it’s highly unusual for context to satisfy
these conditions. Names provide a way for speakers to bring attention to entities in
order to communicate something about them. Felicitously using a name thus
typically requires that everyone in the conversation associates the same thing with
the name. Felicitously using epistemic modals, by contrast, often doesn’t require
having explicitly settled on a specific body of information. Indeed, a principal
feature of epistemic modals often regarded as problematic for contextualism is their
role in managing speakers’ assumptions about what possibilities to treat as live.17
But if there isn’t an agreed-upon body of information salient in the discourse,
uttering a non-subject-linked epistemic attitude ascription runs the risk of failing to
clearly characterize the subject’s beliefs. Explicitly specifying this information—
‘S thinks such-and-such information implies/is compatible with /’—would make
the intended interpretation more readily retrievable. So, using a bare epistemic
modal instead would be dispreferred. Even so, I think we can construct contexts
which satisfy conditions (a)–(c) and license global readings.
Suppose we’re stuck in the lab with no access to windows, phones, internet, etc.,
and we’re wondering what the weather is like outside. Earlier we saw Harry and
Ingrid with what appeared to be wet rain jackets, and Harry seemed more glum than
usual. We’re terrible at figuring out what the weather is like given this sort of
indirect evidence, but we know Georgina is excellent at it. So we send Jerry to her
office to ask what she thinks. We don’t know whether Georgina herself would
accept our apparent evidence as reliable—she is a cautious character—but we
accept it. When Jerry gets back, we ask him what Georgina thinks about what the
weather must be like, given our evidence. Jerry says:
(36) She thinks it must be raining. The sprinklers never come on on Fridays.
Ingrid never wears a jacket unless it’s raining. And Harry hates the rain; it’s
the only thing that could get him down after his team wins, which they did
yesterday.
Jerry’s utterance seems felicitous. The (a)-condition is met since what we’re
interested in is Georgina’s belief about whether our evidence about Harry and Ingrid
licenses inferring that it’s raining. The (b)-condition is met since it doesn’t matter
for our purposes whether Georgina accepts our testimony about this evidence. It’s
explicit in the conversation that we accept it, and that Georgina tends to be more
skeptical. And the (c)-condition is met since we treat Georgina’s belief about the
logical properties of our evidence as relevant to what we should infer about the
weather, and since our mutual acceptance of this evidence is already contextually
salient. So, there is no potential confusion about the intended interpretation of
‘must’ or about what belief is being ascribed.
17 See, e.g., Stephenson (2007), Richard (2008), Yalcin (2012a), Stalnaker (2014), Swanson (2016a). For
examination of this role of epistemic modals in a contextualist theory, see Silk (2016a: chs. 2–3).
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It’s a commonplace that conversational factors can affect what readings are
available for sentences with lexically underspecified content. Although context
typically leaves global readings of epistemic attitude ascriptions unavailable,
exceptions may be possible in principled types of circumstances. We can provide a
unified semantics for epistemic attitude ascriptions like (10b)/(11) and (36) along
with a conversational explanation for their differences.
It’s worth pausing to reflect on the theoretical import of examples such as (36). I
grant that global readings of epistemic attitude ascriptions are typically marked, and
that even if global readings are possible, they require substantial contextual setup.
One might wonder whether it would theoretically preferable to introduce non-
contextualist semantic mechanisms that predict obligatory subject-linking with
epistemic modals—e.g., an informational parameter in the index which is
systematically shifted by attitude verbs (Sect. 4)—and then explain away examples
like (36), perhaps like cases of coercion. I would like to make two points in reply.18
First, note that a conversational explanation of the preference for local readings is
compatible with this preference’s having become conventionalized. Even if it has, it
remains open whether the conventionalized subject-linking is best captured within a
contextualist or non-contextualist framework. For a contextualist, it might be
captured as a substantive constraint in the lexical semantics—e.g., that the value for
Pe be given by the assignment characterizing the immediate local context (cf.
Truckenbrodt 2006 for a cross-linguistic precedent). Such a rule needn’t amount to a
stipulation. Indeed our discussion provides a basis for the relative infrequency of
global readings of epistemic attitude ascriptions—i.e., for why it would be relatively
rare for speakers to characterize subjects’ beliefs about the logical properties of a
body of globally endorsed information by using a bare epistemic modal, rather than
by (e.g.) explicitly specifying the information. Given this infrequency, and general
principles of cooperative conversation, we should expect speakers typically not to
use bare epistemic modals to communicate such claims, and expect hearers typically
not to assume global readings—highly artificial contexts such as in (36)
notwithstanding (cf. Grosz 2014).19 It might not be surprising if such interpretive
patterns were eventually conventionalized in a lexical rule.
Moreover, there are positive reasons for preferring a contextualist implementa-
tion of the hypothesis that subject-linking with epistemic modals has become
conventionalized. Tendencies for local versus global readings vary among context-
sensitive expressions—both among paradigm context-sensitive expressions and
expressions which have figured in recent contextualism/relativism/expressivism
debates. For instance, we noted in Sect. 2.2 that perspectival expressions like ‘local’
18 Thanks to Daniel Rothschild for discussion.
19 See Grosz (2014), drawing on Lewis (1969), for a game-theoretic derivation of a general
conventionalized principle Utilize Cues!, which enjoins speakers to speakers to add explicit elements
to make a marked (infrequent) use of an ambiguous utterance more salient, unless the intended
interpretation is independently salient in the discourse context. It would be interesting to compare the
conversational treatment of embedding phenomena in this section with discourse-based accounts of
logophoricity (Kuno 1987; Pollard and Sag 1992). See note 9 for corpus studies on embedded epistemic
modals.
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naturally receive local readings. Likewise for the prestate presupposition of change-
of-state verbs, as with ‘stop’ in (37):
(37) Bert has never smoked, but Alice thinks he used to in college. She thinks he
stopped smoking last week.
On the flip side, many positive form gradable adjectives exhibit distinctive
discourse properties like those seen with epistemic modals, which has led some
theorists to give them analogous non-contextualist semantics20; however, the
conditions discussed above for the availability of global readings are more easily
satisfied. Suppose that yesterday we were discussing with Alice how many hairs are
on Harry’s head. It turns out she counted: 114. Now we’re at a party, and Bert, who
wasn’t party to yesterday’s (all-too-lively) conversation, says he just saw ‘‘a bald
man’’ across the room, but he isn’t sure if the man’s name is ‘Harry’ or ‘Gary’. Bert
thinks that Alice, unlike us, is well acquainted with Harry. So he asks us, as a way of
discovering the man’s identity, whether she thinks Harry is bald. Knowing that Bert
accepts a high standard, and hence that having 114 hairs wouldn’t suffice for
baldness by his lights, we say:
(38) Alice thinks Harry isn’t bald. The man you saw must’ve been Gary.
We can use Bert’s high standard, which we have accepted for purposes of
conversation, to characterize Alice’s beliefs about the state of Harry’s head:
(a) what matters for our purposes is Alice’s belief about Harry’s degree of baldness,
and the relation between this degree and the standard for baldness (how bald one
must be to count as bald) that is accepted in the discourse; (b) it doesn’t matter for
our purposes what standard for baldness Alice accepts; (c) we have reason to
describe Alice’s belief using ‘bald’ for the same reason we usually have to use
vague language—greater specificity is unnecessary for addressing Bert’s question
concerning the man’s identity. So, there is no risk of confusion about the intended
interpretation of ‘bald’ or about what belief is being ascribed. These observations
support the conversational explanation in this section for the apparent constraint
against non-subject-linked readings with epistemic modals.
It’s beyond the scope of this paper to provide a general account of variations
among context-sensitive expressions in preferences for local/global readings.21 My
point here is simply that there is a spectrum along which context-sensitive
expressions fall in the extent to which they exhibit phenomena often thought
problematic for contextualism.22 On one side is (e.g.) gender presuppositions of
pronouns, which typically receive global readings, as reflected in (39) (Sudo 2012).
(39) #Alicei thinks Suej is a man. Shei thinks hej is kind.
20 E.g., Barker (2002), Richard (2008); for additional discussion see Silk (2016a: ch. 6).
21 See Tonhauser et al. (2013), Silk (2016a) and references therein for recent discussion; see also Sudo
(2012) for discussion of speaker-variation in preferences.
22 See Silk (2014, 2016a) for additional examples and discussion.
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On the other side is epistemic modals, which typically receive local readings. But
many expressions fall in between. Even if subject-linking has become convention-
alized with epistemic attitude ascriptions, a strategy like the one pursued in this
section promises a more explanatory account than existing (contextualist and non-
contextualist) accounts which stipulate subject-linking in the lexical or composi-
tional semantics, and a more theoretically unified account than non-contextualist
accounts which capture the various embedding data via distinct compositional
semantic mechanisms.
3.4 Epistemic contradictions
I think the literature has been too quick to grant the data concerning embedded
‘‘epistemic contradictions’’—sentences such as ‘/ and might :/’ embedded in
suppositional environments. First, as may be expected, examples with non-
expressive uses are coherent: the possibility entertained in (40) is one where the
police’s evidence, which we don’t endorse, is compatible with Lara’s having killed
Fischer even though she didn’t.
(40) [Context: Same as in (7).]
If Lara didn’t kill Fischer but she might have, there’s a chance she’ll get
screwed by the police.
The more dialectically relevant observation is that there are also felicitous examples
with expressive uses (Sect. 1)—the sorts of uses characteristic of inquiry and
planning, those not readily paraphrasable with an ‘according to’-type phrase.
Intuitively, the possibility entertained in (41) is one in which one’s evidence leaves
open the possibility that a tiger is in the bushes even though there is actually no tiger
there.
(41) If a tiger might be in the bushes but there isn’t one, you should still run away.
One can never be too careful.
Retrospective examples are also possible:
(42) If there wasn’t a tiger in the bushes but there might have been, you still
should have run away. You need to be more careful.
In (43) the evidence for interpreting ‘might’ is even endorsed in the discourse (Sect.
3.2).
(43) [Context: Same as in (33). You, the amnesiac, say:]
I’m not sure whether I might have killed him. But if I might have killed him
and I didn’t, there’s a chance I’ll get screwed.
I will continue to use ‘epistemic contradiction’ for sentences such as ‘/ and
might :/’, but we can now see that the label is tendentious. Though such sentences
frequently give rise to a ‘‘phenomenology of contradiction’’ (Dorr and Hawthorne
2013)—hence the label—there needn’t be anything contradictory (infelicitous,
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incoherent) about embedded ‘‘epistemic contradictions.’’ Further, examples like
(41)–(43) cannot be dismissed by a semantic theory. Unlike global readings of
epistemic attitude ascriptions, felicitous embedded epistemic contradictions are
available even with little-to-no contextual setup. Such examples pose a problem for
any theory that treats accepting ‘/ and might :/’ as semantically incoherent. This
includes not only Yalcin’s semantics but also various relativist and dynamic
semantics.23
Merely pointing out felicitous examples like (41)–(43) doesn’t suffice for a
response to Yalcin’s puzzle. As Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) note, felicitous
embedded epistemic contradictions raise a puzzle, not only for contextualists. All
types of theories grant that epistemic modals sometimes receive (what I’m calling)
non-expressive, descriptive readings (see n. 5). Yet when a sentence has multiple
readings, some but not all of which are vacuously true/false, our typical response is
to focus on coherent possible interpretations rather than judge the sentence
infelicitous,24 as we often do with epistemic contradictions. We need to explain how
the (in)felicity of embedded epistemic contradictions depends on context, and why,
if (say) a contextualist semantics is correct, embedded epistemic contradictions are
often anomalous in ‘‘out-of-the-blue’’ contexts and often worse than examples
where an information state is explicitly specified.
Start with an unembedded epistemic contradiction:
(19) #The butler is the killer, but he might not be.
Updating with the first conjunct restricts the context set to b-worlds in which the
butler is the killer. However, the second conjunct assumes a value for Pe that is
compatible with :b. Given the conceptual connection between Pe, which represents
a body of endorsed information, and the discourse common ground, these
constraints are incompatible.
Analogous points hold with epistemic contradictions embedded in suppositional
environments. It’s well known that conditional antecedents and suppositional verbs,
like attitude verbs, establish subordinate information states.25 In (44) ‘suppose’ sets
up a local context which includes the information that there is a thief. This licenses
using the pronoun even though its existence presupposition isn’t satisfied by the
discourse common ground.
23 E.g., Veltman (1996), Stephenson (2007), Hacquard (2010), MacFarlane (2011), Willer (2013). On
Yalcin’s domain semantics, ‘/ and might :/’ is semantically incoherent in the following sense: when
embedded, it places incompatible constraints on an information state parameter in the index; when
unembedded, it places incompatible constraints on the context set. See Dorr and Hawthorne (2013:
Sect. 3) for critical discussion of alternative ways of explaining the epistemic contradictions data within a
broadly relativist framework.
24 Though not always. It would be instructive to compare the account in this section of (in)felicity
patterns involving embedded epistemic contradictions in terms of preferences for local readings of
epistemic modals, with (e.g.) discussions of (in)felicity patterns involving embedded gendered pronouns
in terms of preferences for global readings of gender presuppositions (e.g. Sudo 2012: 30–34).
25 See, e.g., Karttunen (1974), Stalnaker (1974, 2014), Heim (1990), Bittner (2011).
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(44) Suppose a thief breaks in. He would take the silver. (cf. Roberts 1989: ex. 13)
Linking the epistemic modal to the local suppositional information state predicts the
incoherence of embedded epistemic contradictions, as in (20):
(20) #Suppose that [the butler is the killer but he might not be].
The truth-conditional content of the non-modalized conjunct requires that this local
context imply b. However, the modalized conjunct presupposes a value for Pe that is
compatible with :b. Given the conceptual connection between the locally supplied
value for Pe and the suppositional information state, these demands are inconsistent.
This account avoids problems with saying that epistemic contradictions are
anomalous because ‘/ and might :/’ is a literal contradiction. ‘/’ and ‘might :/’
can both be true at a point of evaluation. The incoherence in anomalous uses of
epistemic contradictions derives from the presuppositional effects of the epistemic
modal on the context in which the non-modal conjunct is proposed for acceptance:
Updating with the truth-conditional content of ‘/’ requires restricting the context to
/-worlds, but accommodating a suitable value for Pe associated with ‘might :/’
requires that the context include some :/-worlds. Just as (19) places incompatible
constraints on the global context, (20) places incompatible constraints on the local
suppositional context. For embedded examples, given the conceptual connection
between the suppositional state and a locally accommodated value for Pe, it is
natural in an ‘‘out-of-the-blue’’ context to resolve Pe to the body of information
characterizing the local suppositional context. This, along with the descriptive fact
that epistemic modal verbs are typically used expressively,26 helps explain the
general infelicity of embedded epistemic contradictions in discourse-initial
contexts. However, we have seen that context can sometimes call for alternative
ways of determining the value for Pe in expressive uses, and alternative epistemic
premise frame variables in non-expressive uses. This correctly predicts the felicity
of embedded epistemic contradictions in such contexts, as we saw with (40)–(43).
First, the non-expressive use in (40) calls for a premise frame variable
representing the information in the filing cabinet. More interesting are the
expressive uses, interpreted with respect to the variable Pe representing a body of
endorsed information. The deliberative/retrospective contexts in (41)–(42) makes
evident why one is being asked to entertain a state of mind that doesn’t fully track
the facts: in (41) we are planning for the possibility that our information is
compatible with a tiger being in the bushes, though there is in fact no tiger there; in
(42) we are evaluating courses of action taken in such a possibility. The specific
contents of the suppositions suggest natural ways of readily accommodating a
suitable body of information—perhaps we hear rustling, catch a glimpse of black
stripes, etc. Third, (43) shows that coherent embedded epistemic contradictions are
possible with a globally supplied value for Pe. You endorse the information
26 See, e.g., Halliday (1970), Foley and Van Valin (1984), Nuyts (2001), Stephenson (2007), Weatherson
(2008).
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provided in the filing cabinet, though you don’t know what it consists of (Sect. 3.2).
The possibility being entertained is one where this information is compatible with
your having killed Fischer even though you didn’t actually kill him. Embedded
epistemic contradictions will be anomalous to the extent that there isn’t a relevant,
readily retrievable premise frame that yields a coherent interpretation in one of these
types of ways.
Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) also aim to provide a contextualist-friendly
explanation of the variety of data involving epistemic contradictions. Dorr and
Hawthorne (D&H) explain the bias toward anomalous readings of embedded
epistemic contradictions—on my reconstruction of their discussion—in terms of
four general claims about conversation and interpretation:
(i) Hereditary Constraint:Most uses of epistemic modals are about the knowledge
of the speaker or a relevant group. However, epistemic modals sometimes
receive ‘‘constrained’’ readings, which mix further contextual information—
e.g., in conjunctions (disjunctions, conditional consequents) where the modal
inherits a constraint from the non-modalized conjunct (disjunct, conditional
antecedent): sentences of the form ‘/ and might/must w’ are often given a
‘‘hereditarily constrained’’ interpretation truth-conditionally equivalent to ‘/
and in some/all epistemically possible worlds in which /, w’ (with epistemic
possibility understood narrowly in terms of a relevant subject’s knowledge).27
(ii) Transparency: We typically assume that people know what they know.
(iii) Ignorance Implicatures: Conditionals with conjunctive antecedents typically
implicate that one doesn’t know either conjunct.
(iv) Preference for Explicitness: In certain types of circumstances, sentences with
implicit contextually supplied arguments are generally dispreferred to
sentences which linguistically specify those arguments.
Very roughly: Given Ignorance Implicatures, uttering ‘If / and might :/...’
typically implicates that the speaker doesn’t know whether ‘might :/’ is true.
Because of Transparency, we thus avoid interpreting ‘might’ simply in terms of the
speaker’s knowledge. Absent a salient alternative interpretation, we may then focus
on a hereditarily constrained interpretation, as per Hereditary Constraint. But ‘/ and
might :/’ is inconsistent on such an interpretation. Further, we won’t then seek
some coherent narrowly epistemic interpretation—on which ‘might :/’ is
interpreted with respect to some other subject S’s knowledge (‘S doesn’t know
that /’)—since, from Preference for Explicitness, using ‘/ and might :/’ would be
a bad way of expressing any such interpretation. Hence the general anomalousness
of ‘If/Suppose / and might :/...’.
27 It’s in terms of the notion of constrained readings that D&H understand examples like (33): the
information relevant for interpreting ‘might’ would be treated as combining the speaker’s knowledge (the
narrowly epistemic considerations) with the information in the filing cabinet (the non-epistemic
considerations, on their understanding). In the case of hereditarily constrained interpretation, D&H reject
an implementation in terms of modal subordination, which treats the embedded epistemic modal’s
quantificational domain in ‘/ and might/must w’ as directly restricted to /-worlds (2013: 883–886),
instead favoring an approach which treats the embedded modal claims as equivalent to ‘in some/all
epistemically possible worlds that are accurate with regard to whether /, w’.
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There are important differences between D&H’s contextualist account and the
account in this paper—both in the semantics, concerning the specific truth-
conditions, and in the pragmatics, concerning the interpretive mechanisms and
conversational factors responsible for generating the posited interpretations. Briefly
canvassing some of these differences, even if only briefly, will help clarify certain
distinctive features of the contextualist account developed here.
First, concerning D&H’s diagnosis of anomalous epistemic contradictions: D&H
may be correct that epistemic modals in conjunctions often receive something like a
‘‘hereditarily constrained’’ interpretation. Yet no account is given of the mecha-
nisms which generate the ‘‘hereditary’’ constraint, or of why the constrained
interpretations are typically so prominent (n. 27). The account in this paper avoids
appealing to hereditarily constrained interpretations, as D&H understand them.
Expressive uses of epistemic modals are treated as presupposing a body of
information endorsed in the context. Anomalous readings of ‘/ and might :/’ are
diagnosed, not in terms of truth-conditional inconsistency, but in terms of
incoherence in accepting / and presupposing information compatible with :/.
Second, concerning D&H’s account of the general bias toward anomalous
readings of epistemic contradictions: Their central claim here is Preference for
Explicitness; this claim, D&H argue, explains why speakers dont fall back on
coherent interpretations of ‘might /’ about a subjects/group’s knowledge. As D&H
note, the preference for linguistically specifying arguments cannot be fully general;
we felicitously leave arguments implicit all the time (indeed, in many cases, even
when no specific contextual resolution is especially salient; cf. Silk 2016a: Sect. 4.4
and references therein). Crucial, then, is to specify the circumstances in which the
posited interpretive preference holds. D&H suggest the importance of contrast. For
instance, in (45) it seems dispreferred to indicate the contrast in locations while
leaving one location implicit.
(45) a. It’s not raining over there but it’s raining here.
b. It’s not raining over there but it’s raining.
(Dorr and Hawthorne 2013: ex. 40)
Likewise, D&H suggest, ‘/ and might :/’ introduces a contrast between reality
and a subject’s knowledge of it; hence the infelicity of (46b) as a way of
communicating the content of (46a), even in discourses which make Sally’s
knowledge especially salient.
(46) a. Fred isn’t on that bus and Sally doesn’t know it.
b. Fred isn’t on that bus and he might be.
(Dorr and Hawthorne 2013: ex. 49)
Two concerns: First, more needs to be said about the relevant notion of contrast. The
examples in (47) intuitively introduce contrasts—in comparison classes, locations,
and domain restrictions, respectively; yet they are felicitous despite leaving the
arguments implicit.
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(47) a. This mouse is big [for a mouse], but this rhino isn’t big [for a rhino].
b. The keys are there [l1], not there [l2].
c. Every sailor [on ship a] waived to every sailor [on ship b].
(cf. Stanley 2005: ch. 3)
Felicitous examples where only one argument is pronounced are also possible
(contrast (45)):
(48) a. This mouse is big for a mouse, but this rhino isn’t big.
b. The keys are there on the table, not there.
c. Every sailor on that ship waived to every sailor.
We need an explanation for why the alleged ‘‘contrast...between reality and Sally’s
knowledge of it’’ (2013: 36) in (46) triggers the Preference for Explicitness, but the
contrasts in (47)–(48) don’t.
Second, even if such an explanation were provided, I am skeptical that any
appeal to contrast will capture ‘‘epistemic contradiction’’-style phenomena with
other types of expressions. Recall (25)–(26) with ‘tasty’ and ‘tall’ from Sect. 2.3.
D&H might say the ‘‘tastes/standards contradictions’’ in (25a)–(26a) introduce
contrasts between our tastes/standards and the tastes/standards of another relevant
subject. But saying this would fail to explain the contrast between (25b)–(26b),
which are infelicitous, and (49)–(50), which presumably also introduce contrasts,
namely in evaluative attitudes, and yet are felicitous.
(49) Suppose the Botticellis are beautiful but we don’t like them. (Then we
should take an art appreciation class.)
(50) Suppose infanticide is wrong but we’re all for it.
I won’t attempt a diagnosis of these broader examples here (see Silk 2016a: Sects.
5.3.2, 7.5). Suffice it to say that an explanation in terms of contrast, and an alleged
Preference for Explicitness, is unlikely to do the trick.
Finally, the contextualist account in this paper provides a different way of
understanding the puzzle posed by the broader epistemic contradictions data.
Expressive uses of epistemic modals aren’t treated as claims about a relevant
individual’s or group’s information (Sects. 3.1–3.2). Given that epistemic modals
are typically used expressively (n. 26), it’s no surprise that hearers tend not to
‘‘rescue’’ epistemic contradictions by accommodating some third-party’s informa-
tion.28 What is needed is for context to provide a relevant way of determining the
value for Pe other than in terms of the common ground or suppositional information
28 Such a response is of course also available to non-contextualist theories. The present account predicts
that making a third-party salient may improve judgments about epistemic-contradiction-style examples
with expressions that more readily receive non-expressive readings. This prediction seems to be borne




state, as in (41)–(43). Absent such an alternative (e.g., in many ‘‘out-of-the-blue’’
contexts), epistemic contradictions will be anomalous for the reasons
explained above.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that we can derive various embedding phenomena with epistemic
modals from a particular contextualist implementation of a standard framework for
modals, general principles of interpretation, broader patterns of use, and typical
features of discourse contexts. In closing I would like to briefly compare the
contextualist treatment of embedding in this paper with certain relativist accounts.
This may help clarify what is at-issue in debates about contextualism, and clarify
some of the advantages/burdens of developing a contextualist account.29
Contextualism, in the sense of Sect. 1, treats epistemic modals as semantically
context-sensitive in the same general kind of way as paradigm context-sensitive
expressions. What has been at-issue in this paper is a question of shifting: how to
capture how the information intuitively relevant for interpreting an epistemic modal
seems to shift from the discourse context in certain embedded linguistic
environments. I offered empirical and methodological motivations for pursuing an
approach which captures shifting phenomena with epistemic modals via the same
interpretive mechanisms as shifting phenomena with various paradigm context-
sensitive expressions. An alternative approach—call it relativism—is to posit
distinct mechanisms for the two kinds of shifting phenomena: the information
relevant for interpreting an epistemic modal is provided by an added parameter in
the index—the sequence of parameters, like a world parameter, that can be shifted
by linguistic operators, like modals and attitude verbs.30 No particular body of
information figures in the semantic content—unlike on a contextualist semantics—
just as no particular world does:
(51) smight /tc ¼ hw; si : s \ s/tc 6¼ ;f g
Locating the relevant information in the index predicts a systematic shift in the
interpretation of epistemic modals under (e.g.) attitude verbs and suppositional
operators: (52a) is true iff Alice’s beliefs are compatible with /; the anomalousness
Footnote 28 continued
(i) Suppose this cat food is tasty but we all hate it, and it’s the only food left on the planet. Then the cat
will be happy, and we’ll probably starve to death.
29 Thanks to Daniel Rothschild and Paolo Santorio for discussion.
30 Relativism thus construed subsumes a variety of broadly relativist and expressivist accounts in the
literature (see n. 16); see Silk (2016a: Appendix) for a more fine-grained taxonomy which draws on issues
beyond semantic shifting (e.g., regarding the definition of truth-in-a-context, and the relation between
compositional semantic value and asserted content). I ignore other potential parameters of the index, such
as a time parameter. See Stalnaker (1970), Lewis (1980), Kaplan (1989) on the standard two-dimensional
semantic framework; I bracket potential differences between a Lewisian index and a Kaplanian
circumstance of evaluation.
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of embedded epistemic contradictions derives from their placing incompatible truth-
conditional constraints on the informational parameter shifted by the suppositional
operator (n. 23).
(52) a. Alice thinks might /
b. sð52aÞtc;w;s = 1 iff
8u 2 DoxA;w : DoxA;w \ s/tc 6¼ ; iff
DoxA;w \ s/tc 6¼ ;
However, first, attention to the broader spectrum of examples shows this
generalization to be incorrect. Second, various distinctive phenomena exhibited
by epistemic modals can be observed to varying extents with other types of context-
sensitive expressions (n. 22). This undercuts some of the motivations for going
relativist in the first place. The burden of proof shifts onto the relativist to motivate
utilizing distinct semantic mechanisms for the array of cases. What initially seemed
to be a cost of contextualism turns out to be a feature. The varieties of expressive
and non-expressive uses, both with epistemic modals and other types of context-
sensitive expressions, are treated as semantically context-sensitive in the same
general kind of way. The goal is then to derive certain patterns/differences in their
interpretation via the expressions’ conventional meanings—truth-conditional and
presupposed—and general principles of interpretation and features of context. Even
if certain embedding phenomena with epistemic modals are due partly to distinctive
conventionalized constraints, such restrictions may have a conversational basis
given a contextualist semantics.
There is much more to be said in comparing various contextualist and non-
contextualist theories. The embedding phenomena considered here aren’t the only
challenges raised by epistemic modals (n. 1). More thorough comparisons among
context-sensitive expressions—including different types of paradigm context-
sensitive expressions, additional categories of epistemic vocabulary, and other
recalcitrant expressions that have figured in (non-)contextualism debates—is
essential. Our broadly conversational account of embedding phenomena with
epistemic modals has raised difficult empirical and theoretical questions about
conventionalization, the varieties of context-sensitive language, and the roles of
context in interpretation. I leave subsequent progressions of the dialectic to future
research.
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